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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)  
10 MAY 1977

## Turner's 'Tight Ship' Policy at CIA Called Reason for Sinking Morale

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An official at the National Security Council recently called a military expert at the CIA and asked for a special report. It was a routine request, following a procedure of direct contacts between specialists that is widespread in the huge government bureaucracy.

The report was prepared and sent. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the head of the NSC, liked it. He sent it on to President Carter, who annotated his praise of the report in the margin.

When the report got back to CIA headquarters with the praise noted on it, there was a different reaction. The new director, Adm. Stansfield Turner, did not take pride in the White House's approval for work from his agency.

Instead, Turner was displeased that the report had gone out without his knowledge. Those responsible for it did not get praise from the boss; they got a sharp reprimand for sending things to the White House without letting Turner see them first.

AS OFFICIALS all over Washington have been reminded again since Jan. 20, it is a normal bureaucratic tendency for a new boss to want to get a grip on things by being consulted. It is especially understandable that the boss would want to know what is being sent up to his boss.

But, despite that tendency, the story of the military report is being cited around town as one example of a problem at the CIA. The problem is morale.

Since Turner ended his last Navy assignment and took command of the CIA two months ago, he has tried to run "a tight ship" at Langley. Sources in both the CIA and other parts of the Washington intelligence community say the tightness has hurt morale at the agency.

The sources' information refers particularly to the analytical side of the agency. The operational, or spying, side is not known to have the same kind of current morale problems, although it has suffered in other ways in recent years of scandals and revelations.

As part of the widely imitated current Chinese practice of blaming trouble on a "gang of four," there is talk in the intelligence community about a "gang of 12" or some similar number at the CIA. This refers to a few people whom Turner has put into

Some sources refer to the gang as old Navy cronies of Turner, but agency officials deny that there is a Navy takeover. While Turner has brought some former colleagues into key positions, the number of naval officers aboard the tight ship is not unusually high, they say.

**THE NEW DIRECTOR'S** naval status is a subject of discussion both at the CIA and at the Pentagon. Turner refused to retire from the Navy when he accepted Carter's invitation to take over the intelligence agency.

This has led to speculation that the admiral hopes to make a record at Langley that will help him return to the Defense Department as the head of the Navy — chief of naval operations — or even as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both jobs will be open in June 1978, and Turner's Annapolis classmate, Carter, would be able to put Turner into one of them.

One keen observer of CIA affairs says some employees find Turner "up-tight" about the agency because he is afraid a mistake might ruin prospects for his ambition as a career naval officer of reaching the top Navy post.

Turner succeeded George Bush, a politician who renounced political ambition and won the respect of CIA employees, who felt Bush understood them. The admiral seems to be winning some respect for his experienced view of intelligence, based on his analytical background in the Navy, but morale is suffering because of a sense that understanding is lacking, a number of sources say.

**PART OF THE** current problem within the agency is a hangover from Bush's time, according to outsiders who are in daily contact with the CIA.

Shortly before the failure of Gerald R. Ford to win presidential re-election ended Bush's one-year tenure at Langley, Bush instituted a number of organizational changes. Although most specialists continued to do the

same kind of work, channels of reporting were changed.

Now some of the changes have come unstuck, one source reports. Others say there is some difficulty in getting professional opinions accepted, and some experienced analysts feel frustrated.

There is also a disagreement over making agency work public. Turner wants to give widespread distribution to the "sanitized" versions of some of the secret studies that the CIA does, but many people both inside and outside the agency have their doubts.

The recent controversy over the agency's world oil production estimate focused some attention on this issue. When Carter used it to support his energy program, there were cries of political use of the CIA. Turner denied this, saying the work "had been in progress for over a year."

Turner's denial was issued in "Notes from the Director, No. 1," which was put out May 3 to provide "personalized communications between senior management and all of the employees." In it, he said that he intended "to continue to provide unclassified information to the public whenever it will be of value."

TEN OR 12 subjects, such as the world food supply, climatic changes and strategic weapons might become unclassified studies published by the CIA. But critics ask whether an organization that is publicly identified as a spy agency ought to be publishing such reports.

Turner's attitude seems to be that the spy agency label should not be allowed to contaminate the fact that the CIA has a great wealth of talented analysts working on subjects that the taxpayers deserve to know about.

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